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NOTES

One can hardly be certain of the text of the statute law in Tennessee.
Any infirmity in the enactment of a statute is cured by its reenactment into
the Code. 6s In case of conflict of the printed act with the enrolled act
corresponding with the original manuscript act, the enrolled act is presumed
to be the correct one. 9 A statute is invalid where it appears that it was
vetoed by the governor and never passed over his veto even though it was
published in the Acts.7° On the other hand, an act properly passed and
regularly approved does not become invalid by reason of a failure to publish
in the Acts.
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HENRY N. WILLIAMS

TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION IN TENNESSEE
With the modern use and development of land, it might seem that
the law of adverse possession was taking its place along with the other
museum pieces of the old English land law. But, as recent cases indicate,
adverse possession is still important, particularly in boundary line disputes
and in cases where land is held under color of title. It is the primary purpose of this Note to show how title to land is acquired by adverse possession
under the statutory provisions of Tennessee.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The acquisition of title to land by adverse possession is purely statutory

in origin.' The first English statutes differed firom present day statutes of
limitation in that they did not set a definite period of time which would
bar the disseised title holder, but named a certain year before which the
disseisee could not allege seisin.2 Later statutes set up the pattern for modern
statutory limitations by providing that no entry could be made into any land
68. Regan v. Fentress County, 169 Tenn. 103, 83 S.W.2d 244 (1935).
69. Weaver v. Davidson County, 104 Tenn. 315, 59 S.W. 1105 (1909). The
enrolled act is preserved in the office of the secretary of state.
70. International Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 181, 47 S.W. 136
(1898).
71. Hancock County v, Hawkins County, 83 Tenn. 266 (1885). For discussion of
a procedure whereby the possible questions of compliance with the constitutional requirements regulating the mechanics of legislative enactment may be speedily disposed
of see Grant, New Jersey's 'Popular Action! in Rem to Control Legislative Procedure,
4 RuTGERs L. REv. 391 (1950).
1. For a general discussion, see 4 TrFFANY, R .L PRoPERTY § 1133 (3d ed., 1939).

and Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARv. L. REv. 135, 137 (1918).
2. The last statute of this kind was said to be the Statute of Westminster I,
1275, 3 EDW. I, c. 39, providing that no seisin could be alleged by the title holder
prior to the year 1189.
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unless within twenty years after the right accrued. 3 Many American jurisdictions-for example, Tennessee whose legal genealogy here extends
through the State of North Carolina to the old English statutes-have shortened this period where the land is held under color of title. "
The policy reason usually given for this legislation is the quieting of
titles to land.5 The preamble to the principal statute in Tennessee on adverse possession reads: "An Act for quieting the citizens of this state in
their possessions, and to prevent litigation."' , But it has also been suggested
that the policy is to penalize the true owner who has slept on his right.7 It
seems more proper to say that this latter suggestion is only a result of the
basic policy of quieting titles.
II.

PRESCRIPTION DISTINGUISHED

Prescription by adverse user should be distinguished from acquisition
of title to land by adverse possession. In contrast to the statutory origin
of adverse possession, the doctrine of prescription is of common law origin,
based upon a fiction adopted by the English judges that a grant or transfer
of a nonpossessory right in the lands of another would be conclusively presumed if it had been exercised as a matter of right for a period of twenty
years.8 Prescription properly applies to nonpossessory or incorporeal rights,
such as easements, while adverse possession is a means of acquiring a title
to possessory interests. 9 Most American courts have adopted the rule that
the period necessary to acquire rights by prescription is the same length of
time required by the local statute of limitation for acquiring title to land by
adverse possession.' 0 Tennessee, however, although having a short statutory
period for adverse possession, has retained the original twenty year period
for prescription.'1
3. 21

JAMES

I, C. 16 (1623).

This statute barred the right of entry, but not the
IV, c. 27, § 34 (1833), was enacted

writ of right. Thus the statute, 3 & 4 WILLIAM

to extinguish all former title after twenty years.

4. See note 17 infra.
5. See Ballantine, supra note 1, at 135; NOTE, 15 VA. L. REV. 498 (1929).
6. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1819, c. 28. The preamble continued: "Whereas many disputes have arisen with regard to the proper construction of the statutes of limitation,
and the time seems fast approaching when titles to land will become so perplexed,
that no man will know, from whom to take or buy lands, for remedy whereof: .
Ibid.
7. See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1134 (3d ed., 1939).
8. See Louisville & N. Ry. v. Hagan, 141 Ky. 20, 131 S.W. 1018 (1910); Hester
v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 650, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937) ; 4 TIFFANY, Op. Cit.
supra note 7, § 1191. These judges used the same length of time as required in the
statute of 21 James 1, c. 16 (1623) for gaining title by adverse possession. See note
3 supra. Most American courts consider this presumption conclusive. E.g., Hester v.
Sawyers, supra; 1 THo.Nr sox, REAL PROPERTY § 418 (2d ed. 1939).
9. 1 THomPso, REAL PROPERTY § 417 (2d ed. 1939).
10. E.g., Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937);
I THo tPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 416 (2d ed. 1939).
11. The leading case is Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329 (1872). Also sec Morgan
County v. Goans, 138 Tenn. 381, 198 S.W. 69 (1917); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Moss-
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A few courts, in applying the same period used in the statute of limitation to that of prescription, have also attempted to transpose other statutory
requirements and conditions of adverse possession. 12 But the analogy between adverse possession and prescription does not follow to this extent, 3
4
and confusion results from such promiscuous treatment.1
III.

PERioDs OF LIMITATION IN TENNESSEE

In Tennessee, there are four distinct ways in which title to land may
be acquired by adverse possession. Three of these are statutory: possession
under recorded color of title, possession without the aid of recorded color
of title, and possession under recorded color of title but unaffected by
disabilities of the title holder. The fourth way is a common law method
of continuous and uninterrupted possession from which the law presumes
a grant.
A. Seven Year Color oJ Title Statute
Section 8582 of the Code provides that where land is held adversely
for a period of seven years under color of title which purports to convey a
fee, and such color of title has been recorded for the full seven years'
adverse possession in the county where the land lies, the adverse claimant
will acquire a title in fee to the land described in the color of title.'5 The Act
man, 90 Tenn. 157, 16 S.W. 64 (1891); Fite v. Gassaway, 27 Tenn. App. 692, 184
S.W.2d 564 (M.S. 1944); see Long v. Mayberry, 96 Tenn. 378, 382, 36 S.W. 1040,
1041 (1896); Smelcer v. Rippetoe, 24 Tenn. App. 516, 520, 147 S.W.2d 109, 112 (E.S.
1940). But cf. Heiskell v. Cobb, 58 Tenn. 638 (1872), holding that adverse possession of
more then seven years gave plaintiff a possessory title to protect his prescriptive right by
injunction. This case was not referred to in Ferrell v. Ferrell, supra. See Bloomstein
v. Clees Brothers, 3 Tenn. Ch.433, 438 (1877) ("In this view, a right of way may, of
course, be acquired by seven years' adverse possession by user, under our Statute of
Limitations, which includes, in like manner, 'lands, tenements, and hereditaments'").
12. For a collection of cases concerning the additional requirements of color of
title and payment of taxes, see Note, 112 A.L.R. 545 (1938).
13. Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536 (1937) (the
statutory requirement of holding adversely under color of title does not apply to prescription). See Ferguson v. Standley, 89 Mont. 489, 300 Pac. 245, 249 (1931), stating
that "not all the requirements of adverse possession of land apply to the acquisition of
an easement by prescription. . . .The occupancy which will ripen into a prescriptive
right need be 'continuous' only in the sense that the claimant exercise his claimed
right without interference at such times as he has need of the use, and it need not be
'exclusive' so long as the right does not depend upon a like right of others." See
Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329, 334 (1872) ; Note, 32 CALTF. L. REv. 438, 441 (1944).
14. The tendency to confuse the two concepts has been noted in some Tennessee
cases. Schooler v. Birge, 51 F. Supp. 610, 612 (M.D. Tenn. 1943); Heiskell v. Cobb,
58 Tenn. 638 (1872).
15. "Any person having had, by himself or those through whom he claims, seven
years' adverse possession of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, granted by this state
or the State of North Carolina, holding by conveyance, devise, grant, or other assurance
of title, purporting to convey an estate in fee, without any claim by action at law or in
equity commenced within that time and effectually prosecuted against him, is vested
with a good and indefeasible title in fee to the land described in his assurance of title.
But no title shall be vested by virtue of such adverse possession, unless such conveyance,
devise, grant, or other assurance of title shall have been recorded in the register's office
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of 1819,16 from which this section was codified, following the original North
Carolina statute of 1715,17 did not contain the requirement of recordation,
Section 858319 bars
but in 1895 this was added by special amendment.'
20
These sections give a
the right, whereas section 8582 bars the remedy.
"good and indefeasible title in fee" to the land described. 2' The title is good
as a sword as well as a shield.
The statute refers to lands "granted by this state or the State of North
Carolina." Some of the early cases said that it must first be shown in setting
up title under these sections that the land has been granted by this state or by
North Carolina, since until the land has been so granted the statute can
not attach or begin to run.Y This grant could be proved as a fact, or it could
be proved by a presumption of law based upon continuous and uninterrupted
possession for a period of twenty years. 24 It seems that this requirement is
obsolete today. Even under these early cases, it was not necessary to connect the adverse claimant's color of title with the grant from the state.20
There are two situations which are not expressly covered by these sections. Suppose that A, as required by section 8582, holds adversely under
for the county or counties in which the land lies during the full term of said seven
years' adverse possession." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8582 (Williams 1934).
Assurance of title, or color of title, as it is more commonly called, has been defined
as a writing purporting upon its face to pass title to land, but which fails to do so,
either from want of title in the person making it or defect in the mode of conveyance.
See Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 203, 135 S.W. 785, 792 (1911).
For examples of assurances of title within the meaning of this section, see Woods v.
Richardson, 190 Tenn. 662, 231 S.2d 340 (1950) ; Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn.
333, 214 S.W2d 50 (1947); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253 (1884) (defective
devises) ; Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060 (1911) (champertous deed) ;
Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785 (1910) (void
tax deed); Patton v. Dixon, 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299 (1900) (chancery sale and
decree, defective because of improper joinder of parties) ; Iron & Coal Co. v. Broyles.
95 Tenn. 612, 32 S.W. 761 (1895) (defective title by descent) ; York v. Bright, 23
Tenn. 312 (1843) (deed voidable because obtained by fraud).
16. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1819, c. 28, § 1.
17. N.C. Laws, 1715, c. 27, § 2.
18. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1895, c. 38. § 1. For the statutory history see Kittel v,
Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500 (1908).
19. "And on the other hand, any person, and those claiming under him, neglecting
for the said term of seven years to avail themselves of the benefit of any title, legal
or equitable, by action at law or in equity, effectually prosecuted against the person
in possession, under recorded assurance of title, as in the foregoing section, are forever
barred."

TENN. CODE ANN. § 8583 (Williams 1934).

20. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500 (1908).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8582 (Williams 1934).

22. Title acquired under these sections will support actions for ejectment. Cannon
v. Phillips, 34 Tenn. 211 (1854). There is a split of authority as to whether the
adverse possessor can remove as a cloud the superior record title no longer enforceable.
See Note, 78 A.L.R. 24, 110 (1932).
In Tennessee, title perfected under these
sections will support a bill to remove clouds from the title. See Patton v. Dixon,
105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299 (1900).
23. Cannon v. Phillips, 34 Tenn. 211 (1854).
24. Ibid.

25. Barton's Lessee v. Shall, 7 Tenn. 215 (1823); see Earnest v. Little River
Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 438, 75 S.W. 1122, 1125 (1902).
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a recorded color of title purporting to convey a fee, while the true title gives
B a life estate with a remainder over to C. As will be seen later, 26 A's adverse possession can not run against the remainderman until the termination of the life estate. But if A holds for seven years, does he perfect a life
estate for the life of B, which will be complete for purposes of bringing actions
of ejectment,27 or will he only acquire the peculiar defensive or possessory
interest provided for in section 8584, hereinafter discussed ?28 Although section 8582 refers only to the vesting of a fee in the adverse claimant, it seems
proper to conclude that there can likewise be a vesting of a life estate in the
adverse claimant and that the interest is not the mere defensive or possessory
title under other code sections. 29
Reversing this situation, a more difficult problem is presented. Suppose that A holds land adversely for seven years under recorded color of
title which purports to give him a life estate with a remainder over to B,
and that C is the real owner in fee. Does A perfect a title to the life estate
of sufficient quality to support actions of ejectment; or does A get only
the possessory interest provided for in section 8584? Although section
8582 refers only to an assurance of title which purports to convey a fee,
there seems to be no valid reason for not giving the benefit of this section
to A, who holds under color of title which purports to convey to him a life
estate. Then, if we say that A perfects the life estate and his interest is
not merely possessory, does this possession inure to the benefit of those
in remainder, perfecting their title also and cutting off the entire title of C?
The case of Brown v. Brown" is directly in point here and seems to be
the only case in which Tennessee has passed -upon this question. Benjamin
Brown died leaving a will devising part of his real estate to his wife for her
life with a remainder in fee to defendants. The will was probated in
common form. Later, in a contest upon the issue of undue influence, the
will was adjudged to be invalid. The administrator brought suit to recover
property in the hands of devisees and legatees. The statute of limitations
was pleaded. It was held that the defendant remaindermen had good title
26. See note 70 infra. ,
27. In Tennessee, the complainant can not succeed in ejectment unless he is able
to show both the legal title and the right to immediate possession. Brier Hill
Collieries v. Gernt, 131 Tenn. 542, 175 S.W. 560 (1914); Hubbard v. Godfrey, 106
Tenn. 150, 47 S.W. 81 (1898) (showing that the law is otherwise in those states
retaining the common law possessory action); see King v. Coleman, 98 Tenn. 561,
566, 40 S.W. 1082, 1084 (1897); Langford v. Love, 35 Tenn. 308, 312 (1855). And
the defendant may successfully defend the suit by showing a better outstanding legal
title in a third person. Crutsinger v. Catron, 29 Tenn. 24 (1848); accord, Campbell
v. Campbell, 40 Tenn. 325 (1859).
28. See note 33 infra.
29. Accord, Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500 (1932); Quarles v.
Arthur, 33 Tenn. App. 291, 231 S.W.2d 589 (E.S. 1950).
30. 82 Tenn. 253 (1884).
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within the meaning of section 8582. The court said: "Theo interests of
the tenant for life and in remainder constitute one estate, the two, when
added together, being equal to an estate in fee." 3'
But there was a forceful
dissent which said, concerning the interpretation of the section, that each
32
estate must stand on its own possession.
B. The Seven-Year Defensive or Possessory Title Statute
If the adverse claimant does not hold under an assurance of title, or
having one, it is not recorded, section 8584 3 gives him, after seven years'
adverse possession, what has been called by the courts a defensive or
possessory title.3 4 This defensive title must be specially pleaded,35 whereas
title acquired under the preceding sections need not be specially pleaded.3 0
Though it does not expressly so provide, this section has been interpreted
to mean that color of title is not necessary.3 7 The law on this point is stated
clearly in Peoples v. Hagazan38 : "It is true we have two statutes of
limitations of 7 years, one requiring a color of title and the other, the one
here relied upon, based purely upon adverse possession without benefit
of title." What is the effect of holding land under this section? The title
is good as a defense to actions of ejectment.3a Its possessory nature gives
the adverse claimant the right to protect his interest by bringing actions
40
of trespass, forcible entry and detainer, and in some cases by injunction,
but the fights obtained under this section are not sufficient to support
actions for ejectment, which in Tennessee requires proof of a legal title. 41
Such an interest is not liable to execution ;42 nor is it alienable or descendable, 43 except in the sense that the prior possessions may be tacked. 44
31. Id. at 255.
32. Id. at 259.
33. "No person or any one claiming under him, shall have any action, either at law
or in equity, for any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, but within seven years after
the right of action has accrued." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8584 (Williams 1934).
34. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500 (1908); Moffitt v. Meeks, 29
Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463 (M.S. 1946), 20 TENN. L. 1Ev. 214 (1948); see
Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329, 334 (1872).
35. Jones v. Mosley, 29 Tenn. App. 559, 198 S.W.2d 652 (M.S. 1946).
36. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785 (1910).
37. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.AV.2d 827 (E.S. 1948) ; Moffitt

v. Meeks, 29 Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463 (M.S. 1946), 20 TENN. L. REv. 214
(1948).,
38. 31 Tenn. App. 398, 402, 215 S.W.2d 827, 828 (E.S. 1948).
39. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500 (1908); Peoples v. Hagaman,
supra note 38; cf. Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889).
40. Liberto v. Steele, 188 Tenn. 529, 221 S.W.2d 701 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv.
337 (1950).
41. See note 27 supra.
42. See Crutsinger v. Catron, 29 Tenn. 24, 30 (1848).
43. Ibid.
44. See Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 510 (1860).
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What is the effect upon the adverse claimant's defensive title if he is dispossessed by the title holder or some third party? It would seem that the
adverse claimant loses all his claims to the land the moment possession is
lost or abandoned, inasmuch as this section only gives him a defense to
court action. 45 But, as noted later, 46 if the adverse possession is continuous
and uninterrupted for as long as twenty years, although not under color
of title, the adverse claimant will get full title by the common law presumption of a grant.
C. The Act of 1923
Section 8586,47 taken from the Act of 1923,4 8 is supplemental to section
8582. It provides that where land has been held adversely for seven years
under an assurance of title purporting to convey a fee which has been
recorded for thirty years, the adverse claimant will acquire an indefeasible
title in fee. Under this legislation, the adverse claim is not affected in any
way by disabilities of the true owner, 49 and the title of the state is not exempt
from the operation of the statute. 50 Under section 8582, title can not be
acquired against persons under disability or against the state. In order to
get the supplemental benefit of section 8586, the color of title must have
been recorded for thirty years instead of the seven years required by
section 8582. This disallowance of disabilities is in accord with the basic
policy of quieting titles. 51 There has been little litigation concerning the
application of these sections, 52 and there are very few cases in which title
has been set up by this means. The paucity of cases possibly indicates that
the saving force of this legislation is not very widely appreciated.
45. See Marr v. Gilliam, supra note 44, at 510; Crutsinger v. Catron, 29 Tenn.

24, 30 (1848).
46. See note 54 infra.

47. "Any person holding any real estate or land of any kind or any legal or
equitable interest therein, and such person and those through whom he claims having
been in adverse possession of same for seven years, where said real estate is held and
claimed by him or those through whom he claims by a conveyance, devise, grant, a
decree of a court of record, or other assurance of title purporting to convey an estate
in fee, and such conveyance, devise, grant, or other assurance of title, has been recorded
in the register's office of the county in which the land lies for a period of thirty years
or more or such decree entered on the minutes of such court for a period of thirty years
or more, is vested with an absolute and indefeasible title to such real estate or interest
therein." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8586 (Williams 1934).
48. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1923, c. 90.
49. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8587 (Williams 1934).
50. Ibid.
51. See note 5 supra. See Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HAMV. L.
ZV. 135, 145 (1918) where the author says: "The efficiency of the doctrine of
adverse possession in quieting titles is greatly impaired by reason of two exceptions
to the operation of the statute, viz., that of disabilities and that of future estates."
52. Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500 (1932) (sections inapplicable
to remaindermen); Quarles v. Arthur, 33 Tenn. App. 291, 231 S.W.2d 589 (E.S. 1950).
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D. The -Common Law Presumption of a Grant
The courts of Tennessee, independently of the statutory limitations,
and in analogy to the doctrine of prescription, have held that where one
has remained in uninterrupted and continuous possession of the land for a
period of twenty years, a grant or deed will be presumed.13 So if the
possessory claimant lacks recorded color of title and is not able to make
out title under section 8582, he may still establish title by presumption of
a grant.54 A title so acquired is sufficient to support actions for ejectment.,
Some older cases have indicated that the presumption is not conclusive
like that in prescription,56 and that it can be rebutted by showing that the
issuance of the grant in a particular case was a legal impossibility. " Even
though as a practical matter it would be nearly impossible to rebut the
presumption, still these statements do not appear to be sound. The presumption of a grant is really not an evidentiary presumption but a rule of
law which has been adopted to further the policy of quieting titles to land.
5 s
The case of Ferguson v. Prince
has pointed out two important differences between setting up title by presumption of a grant and perfecting
title under section 8582. In that case a grantor transferred possession of
land, part of which was described in the deed to the grantee and part of
which was not described in the deed but which had been held adversely
by the grantor. There was no evidence showing an intent on the part of
the grantor to convey the part adversely held, but this part was used by
the grantee in connection with that conveyed by the deed. The court held
that no privity existed between grantor and grantee as to this part so as
to make out title under section 8582, 59 but that title could be established
on the theory of presumption of a grant. The court said that when presumption of a grant is relied upon it need not be shown that there was any
legal privity between the successive occupants, the only requirement being
the absence of any gap between the possessions. 0o This seems to be a loose

53. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548 (1916); Williams v. Donell,
39 Tenn. 695 (1859); Cannon v. Phillips, 34 Tenn. 211 (1854); accord, Hanes v.
Peck's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 228, 231 (1827) ; see Dunn v. Eaton, 92 Tenn. 743, 753, 23 S.W¢.
163, 165 (1893).
54. Ferguson v. Prince, supra note 53; Cannon v. Phillips, supra note 53.
55. Cannon v. Phillips, supra note 53.
56. See note 8 supra.
57. See Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 501 (1860) ; Williams v. Donell, 39 Tenn.
695, 698 (1859) ; Hanes v. Pecek's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 228, 236 (1827).
58. 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548 (1916).
59. M~any courts, including those of Tennessee, have held that there must be some
evidence that the grantor intended to transfer possession to the additional land. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548 (1916) ; Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W.
794, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889); see Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 405, 215
S.W.2d 827, 830 (E.S. 1948). Perhaps it is better to say that privity should be
inferred from the change in possession. See Note, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 769 (1951).

60. Ferguson v. Prince, supra note 59, at 556, 190 S.W. at 552.
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statement and should not be extended beyond the facts of the case. The
other difference noted in the case is the figuring of disabilities or ascertaining the time during which the true owner's rights and remedies are not
affected by the running of time. 61
E. When Do the Limitation Periods Run?
Generally, the statutory period of limitation starts to run at the time
the cause of action accrues. However, the statute, as a general rule, will
not begin to run against persons under a disability at the time the cause
accrues until the removal of the disability. In Tennessee, the statute begins to run against persons under disability when the cause accrues, but
section 857462 provides that a minor or a person of unsound mind shall
have three years after removal of disability in which to bring his action,
unless the statute as computed from the accrual of the cause gives a longer
period. This three-year saving statute for minors and persons of unsound
mind has no application when title is set up on the theory of presumption
of a grant.63 There the time during which the disability existed is subtracted from the total time of adverse possession. 64 As already observed, 65
when title is set up under section 8586, disabilities are disregarded even
though existing at the time the cause accrued.
To illustrate these different computations, assume that B has held
land adversely for six years, at which time A, the true owner, reaches 21.
B continues in possession. When A reaches 23, he becomes of unsound
mind, remaining in such a state for five years when he is adjudged sane.
(1) If B is able to satisfy the requirements of either section 8582 (the
color-of-title statute) or section 8584 (the defensive-title statute), A's
action would be barred after nine years of adverse possession, or when A
reached 24. The three-year statute for minors and persons of unsound
mind would apply to give A three years after removal of minority, since
the disability existed when the cause of action accrued. The supervening
disability of insanity is disregarded because it did not exist at the time the
cause accrued. (2) If B attempts to set up title on the theory of presumption of a grant,. A's action would not be barred until 18 years after. the
61. See notes 63, 64 infra.
62. "If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of
action accrued, either (I) within the age of twenty-one years, or (2) of unsound

mind, such person, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence
the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the
particular cause of action, unless it exceed three years, and in that case within three
years from the removal of such disability." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8574 (Williams 1934).
63. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tern. 543. 190 S.W. 548 (1916).
64. Ferguson v. Prince, supra note 63; see Scruggs v. Baugh, 3 Tenn. App. 256, 263
(M.S. 1926).
65. See note 49 supra.
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removal of the second disability of insanity. The six years of minority and
the five years of insanity are counted out, and there must remain 20 years
of adverse possession after this deduction before A's action is barred and B
gets full title. (3) If B is able to satisfy the requirements of section 8586
by holding under a color of title which has been recorded for thirty years,
A's action would be barred after a lapse of seven years or when A reached
22, all disabilities being disregarded.
The three-year period was intended as an additional grace period, and
not intended to cut down the time fixed by the statute. 60 For example,
assume that B has held land adversely for two years when A, the true
owner, reaches 21. B continues in possession until A reaches 25 at which
time A brings an action against B. A does not, in such a case, have to
bring his action within three years after attaining his majority, but may do
7
so within seven years after the accrual of the cause of action.
The question of whether the statute should run against the remainderman before the falling in of the life estate has drawn considerable comment.
It is generally said that since the remainderman has no cause of action
until the termination of the life estate, the possession can not be adverse
to him until the death of the life tenant.68 But in some states, like Iowa
and Nebraska, where the remainderman is given a remedy by statute to
remove clouds on title, it is held that the statute begins to run against
him at the same time as against the life tenant. 69 In Tennessee, the statute
does not run against the remainderman until the termination of the life
estate. 0 Nor does section 8586 affect the rights of the remainderman, 1
although it does cut off disabilities and the rights of the state.
IV. APPLICATION OF STATUTES

The courts, in applying the statutes of limitation pertaining to adverse
possession, have said that in order to acquire title, the possession must be
actual, open and notorious, hostile or adverse, exclusive and continuous for
66. Jackson v. Crutchfield, 111 Tenn. 394, 77 S.W. 776 (1903) ; see Patton v. Dixon,
105 Tenn. 97, 102, 58 S.W. 299, 300 (1900).
67. Cf. Jackson v. Crutchfield, supra note 66.
68. E.g., Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940), 39 MicH. L. REv.
141. See Brittenum v. Cunningham, 310 Ky. 131, 220 S.W.2d 100 (1949), 3 VAND. L.
REv. 334 (1950) for a rather novel holding that the statute runs first against the life
tenant and after cutting off his rights then begins to run against the remainderman,
although the life tenant is still living. The protection of the remainderman has been
criticized. See Ballantine, snpra note 51, at 145; Note, 22 Miss. L.J. 224 (1951).
69. 3 SIMs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 778 (1936).
70. Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500 (1932) ; Quarles v. Arthur,
33 Tenn. App. 291, 231 S.W.2d 589 (E.S. 1950). See Dunn v. Eaton, 92 Tenn. 743, 752,
23 S.W. 163, 165 (1893).
71. Guy v. Culberson, supra note 70.
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the statutory period. 72 In short, adverse possession requires the doing of
acts on the land sufficiently pronounced to charge the owner that an adverse
73
claim has been asserted.
The element giving the courts the most difficulty is that of hostility.74
There is no agreement, particularly in cases involving boundary line disputes, as to what kind of mental attitude satisfies this element. The typical
boundary line dispute arises where A, mistaken as to the true boundary
of his land, encroaches upon and encloses adjacent land belonging to B. 75
Can A acquire title to the disputed land if he took possession under the
mistaken belief that he owned to the extent of the enclosure? Most courts,
following what is known as the Connecticut rule,76 have held that the court
will not burden itself by looking into the possessory claimant's mind to see
whether he intended to hold to the extent of the enclosure or only to the
true boundary. This Connecticut rule is favored by the textwriters. 77
Other courts have practically reached the same result by holding, under
what is known as the Missouri rule, that mistake is merely evidential, raising
a presumption that the land was held adversely and hostile to the true
owner. 78 On the other hand, the Iowa rule holds that title to such land
cannot be acquired if taken under mistake, and permits inquiry into the
possessor's mind to determine intent. 79 The Tennessee courts, following the
Connecticut rule on the authority of the leading case of Erck v. Church,8 0
have held that an actual, open and exclusive enclosure of the land in dispute,
although taken and held by accident or mistake, is sufficient to vest title by
72. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wall 120, 145, 20 L. Ed. 765 (U.S. 1871);
Cowan v. Hatcher, 59 S.W. 689, 691 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900). Some few states by
statute require in addition to these "common law" elements the payment of all taxes
and assessments during the period of the adverse occupancy. See 2 C.J.S., Adverse
Possession § 171 n.94 (1936). For a discussion on this requirement of the Indiana
statute, see Gavit, In Defense of the Indiana Adverse Possession Act of 1927, 4 IND.
L. J. 321 (1929).
73. It has been said that the adverse possessor "must unfurl his flag on the land,
and keep it flying, so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded
his domains, and planted the standard of conquest." Willamette Real-Estate Co. v.
Hendrix, 28 Ore. 485, 42 Pac. 514, 517 (1895).
74. See, generally, on hostility of possession, 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ '1142
et seq. (3d ed. 1939); Sternberg, The Element of Hostility in Adverse Possession,
6 TEmPLE L.Q. 207 (1932).

75. For a compilation of cases on this subject, see Notes, 97 A.L.R. 14 (1935).
76. For an analysis of the various rules, see Sternberg, supra note 74.
77. Darling, Adverse Possession in. Boundary Cases, 19 OaR. L. REv. 117 (1940);
Sternberg, supra note 74; Notes, 26 Ky. L.J. 248 (1938), 11 Rocicv MT. L. REv. 214
(1939), 3 VAND. L. REv. 337 (1950), 15 VA. L. REv. 498, 501 (1929), 4 Wis. L. REv.
41 (1926). See Note, 7 OR. L. REv. 329 (1928), discussing the distinction taken by
the Oregon courts between cases of "conscious doubt" as to the location of boundary
and cases of "pure mistake" where the courts make an inquiry into the possessory
claimant's mind.
78. See Sternberg, supra note 74, at 218.
79. See Bordwell, Mistake and Adverse Possession, 7 IowA L. BULL. 129, 137
(1922), for a criticism of the rule in Iowa law.
80. 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889).
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adverse possession.8 ' A possible way to help simplify the law on this
point is first to see whether the original owner has a cause of action. If
the enclosure is made under the permission, express or implied, of the original
owner, then there would be no trepass which would give rise to a cause
of action. The statute of limitation would not start running until demand
was given to vacate the disputed strip. If the enclosure is made without
the permission of the original owner, then a cause of action would exist
and the possession should be considered adverse.
The courts have also said that the possession must be continuous for
the statutory period;82 if the continuity of possession is broken, a new
statutory period will begin to run. The continuity may be broken in some
states by re-entry of the true owner,. 3 and in all the states the period may
be broken by proper legal proceedings brought by the owner. Generally,
the continuity can not be broken so that a new period will run until a final
judgment is obtained in favor of the true owner. Mere commencement
of the suit will suspend the statute only as far as that particular proceeding
is concerned. A few states require, in addition to the final judgment, a change
in possession. 4 Tennessee provides by statute that title may be acquired
if no action is "commenced within that time and effectually prosecuted,"8
which probably means that a final judgment must be obtained. But Tennessee, like many other states, also provides that if the suit is commenced
within the prescribed time but dismissed %'vithouta final determination on
the merits, or if a judgment, given in favor of a plaintiff, is arrested or
reversed, then the plaintiff will have a period of one more year after such
dismissal, arrest or reversal in which to bring another action, even though
the limitation period expires in the meantime.80
81. Liberto v. Steele, 188 Tenn. 529, 221 S.W.2d 701 (1949), 3 VAND. L. Rv.
337 (1950) ; Williams v. Hewitt, 128 Tenn. 689, 164 S.W. 1198 (1913) ; Peoples v.
Hagarnan, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827 (E.S. 1948); cf. Gates v. Butler, 22
Tenn. 447 (1842). But cf. Buchanan v. Nixon, 163 Tenn. 364, 43 S.W.2d 380, 80 S.L.R.
151 (1931), setting up the tenuous distinction that when the boundary line fence is
set up not by the possessory claimant but by the tenant of the true owner inside the
true owner's boundary without intention of fixing a property line no title can be
acquired by adverse possession. The court says that a contrary holding on the facts of
the particular case would "discard the last vestige remaining of the essentiality of intent
in the application of the doctrine of adverse possession." Id. at 371, 43 S.W.2d at 382.
See Gibson v. Shuler, 29 Tenn. App. 166, 194 S.W.2d 865 (E.S. 1946), apparently
following the Missouri rule, the presumption being used in the absence of positive
or unambiguous circumstances.
82. See, generally, Taylor, Continvity in Adverse Possession of Land, 27 IowA L.
REv. 396 (1942).

83. Id. at 400.
84. Id. at 408.

85.

TENx. CODE

86. Id. § 8572.

ANN. § 8582 (Williams 1934).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The Tennessee courts have been unnecessarily burdened with the interpretation and application of ambiguous statutes; in consequence, the
material to be found on adverse possession is voluminous and difficult to
analyze. Yet the law on this subject seems to satisfy present day needs
and is basically in accord with the policy of quieting titles. The method
by which title may be acquired regardless of disabilities seems desirable.
The seven-year defensive or possessory title statute, although peculiar in
its nature, tends to encourage use and development of rural and mountainous
lands. The presumption of a grant affords a way for one, having no
color of title, to acquire more than a mere possessory interest. The rule in
Tennessee that adverse possession cannot run against the remainderman
before the termination of the life estate seems to be the better view. However, there does not appear to be any reason why the courts, in figuring
the time during which the owner is not bound by the running of the statute
because of disabilities, should make a different computation when title is
set up by presumption of a grant than when it is set up under section
8582. Nor is any reason apparent why the court should dispense with
privity in the former and require it in the latter. The law should not dispense with privity in either theory.
ALLEN SHiOFFNER

